A fundamental point when understanding how technology is acquired is that technology is not just a physical thing but also comprises knowledge embedded in hardware and software. The acquisition of technological capability is therefore not a one-off process but a cumulative one in which learning is derived from the development and use of technology. There is a view that national competitiveness is obtained by strengthening the science base and developing Research and Development (R&D) capacity. However, activities formally identified as science and R&D are only one part of the overall process which includes learning by doing (increasing the efficiency of production operations), learning by using (increasing efficiency by the use of advanced equipment and complex systems) and learning by interacting with suppliers and customers. It should also be noted that in many industries only a fraction of the technological efforts of firms is carried out in dedicated scientific or R&D facilities. Evangelista et al (1998) recognise the different elements of inno vation and innovation processes. They use evidence from a large-scale survey of European enterprises to show that 50 per cent of the total innovation expenditure is embodied in plant, machinery and equipment purchased by firms. The internal technological expenditures devoted to R&D, design and trial production are 20 per cent, 10 per cent and 11 per cent respectively of the total innovation expenditure with the rest devoted to acquiring technology through patents and licences. Therefore reported R&D expenditures are only a proxy for innovation related activities
The accumulation of skills, experiences and technical know-how at the levels of firms, industrial sectors and countries takes time and is essential for the long run development of national competitiveness. The existing knowledge base is important for developing further knowledge and capabilities and new products and processes. The above observations have clear implications for the absorptive capacity of a country. The policies and stances taken by enterprises and institutes are often based on the assumption that acquiring technology in the form of designs and hardware and possibly reverse engineering are sufficient for absorbing and using technologies and developing innovative capabilities. This may be true for some basic technologies but is unlikely to be the case with more advanced technologies.
Box 1 -Types of transferred technology and assessing its impact
It is important to recognise that there are two types of technology transfer. The first of these is vertical transfer, which is when technology is transferred from research to development to production. Thus it follows the progressive stages of invention, innovation and diffusion, with the technology becoming more commercialised as it proceeds through each stage. Vertical transfer can be within one organisation or there may be an intermediate transaction between, say, a research institute and a manufacturing company.
The second type of technology transfer is horizontal transfer. Here an established technology is transferred from one operational environment to another. The purpose of horizontal transfer is not to commercialise the technology, rather it is to disseminate the technology and extend its application into other contexts. This type of transfer is of concern to companies that wish to maximise the return from their technology, but may be unable to do this by direct selling of end products into the market place. More importantly for the purpose of this paper is that horizontal transfer is the most common type when technology is being transferred from industrialised to developing countries. There is usually no further improvement or change to the technology unless it needs to be modified to suit local circumstances or environmental conditions.
Regarding the technology being transferred, this itself can be of two types. First, it can be 'product technology', the transfer elements of which would involve the design details of a particular product and the know-how for part, or all, of its manufacture. Second, it can be 'process technology'. Here, transfer would be of the means of manufacture and could be used in connection with the production of different products or parts of products; either existing or new. These two technology types are not mutually exclusive. It is not unusual, for example, for the transfer of product technology to be accompanied by the transfer of some aspect of the process for making the product.
When technology is transferred it can be in various forms. For example, in product technology transfer it can involve the materials and components that together form the end-product, while in process technology transfer it can comprise production equipment and tools. This would normally be the hardware aspect of technology. However, in both product and process technology transfer it can also comprise documentation and procedures on the design and manufacture of the product or instructions in use of the equipment, which is the technology software. Also, in both product and process technology transfer it can comprise know-how and skills, which is often called the technology 'humanware'. This differs from software in that it will embrace the technology supplier's accumulated knowledge about how and why things are done, i.e. the 'tacit' knowledge aspects of the technology.
To further understand the impact of technology transfer through its subsequent dissemination in different applications consider the framework in Figure 1 .
This places transferred technology on a vertical scale according to its scope, as determined by the spread of user application, and on a horizontal scale according to its span, as determined by the number of users per technology application.
Four modes of technology transfer are thereby defined by this classification. "Simple point to point transfer" is where the spread of user applications is narrow and the number of users few. An example could be the technology for an integrated steel making. Its use is strictly limited to the production of steel and the number of integrated plants in operation would be relatively small. "Simple diffusion" is where the spread of user applications is narrow and the number of users many. An example of this could be the technology for canning food. Again the use of this technology is limited but the number of applications would be much greater. "Complex diffusion" is where the spread of applications is wide and the number of users many. Here an example could be ink jet printing technology. Here the application goes beyond its use in printers for computers. It can also be applied in printing code numbers onto packaging, 'sell by' dates onto containers, seating details onto theatre tickets etc. Lastly, "complex point-to-point transfer" is where the spread of applications is wide but the number of users few. The computer numerically controlled, or CNC, machine tool falls into this category. The numbers produced are usually fairly low compared with other products while user applications are extremely diverse. In fact, it is quite common for each machine to be individually engineered for a particular application, which could be in a wide range of different industries.
Figure 1 Technology transfer modes and types of dissemination
Source -Adapted from Leonard-Barton, D (1990) 
Technology and competitiveness
In discussing the relationship between technology, competitiveness and economic growth at the macro level, the OECD (1992) concludes that "the proposition that investment in R&D and technological progress are essential for future economic growth has not yet been conclusively empirically demonstrated". The difficulty of demonstrating this relationship is understandable as R&D is just one component of innovative activity that takes place within enterprises, albeit within the context of its external linkages and government policies. For an enterprise, competitiveness refers to the capacity to create and sustain cost and/or product advantages to gain or maintain strong positions in the markets for its products and a high level of profitability. In general, the advantages are based on the ability of a firm to (a) successfully define its scope, (b) manage and coordinate the core functions and operations within the enterprise as well as relationships with suppliers and custome rs, and (c) be aware of market demand characteristics and respond to them appropriately. In advanced technology sectors, technology and the ability to innovate are key aspects of the organisational knowledge of a firm that give it distinctive capabilities and competitive advantages.
However, it is also necessary to combine these capabilities with the ability to commercialise the technology. Such a combination requires effective interactive and responsive relationships between marketing, formal R&D and design engineering. In this respect, a strong correlation has been found between a corporation's competitiveness and its ability to commercialise technology. In a diverse range of markets and products (photocopiers, fax machines, computers, cars, semi-conductor production equipment and pharmaceuticals), industry leadership not only rests on technology but on the superior commercialisation skills. According to Nevens et al (1990) in such R&D intensive industries "companies that are first to market the products based on advanced technologies demand higher margins and gain market shares. Companies that spin out variants more rapidly and leverage their core technology across more markets earn higher returns." The ability to make better use of generic features of key contemporary technologies is also another feature of firm level competitiveness.
There are some clear implications of the above observations for the competitiveness of enterprises. The recognition of commercialisable technologies and the capability to commercialise them are crucial. However, an important qualification is that most of the evidence is from industrialised countries. The gaining of technological capability in the newly industrialised countries was based initially on learning to use established technology. Their emphasis has therefore been less on basic research and more on combining applicable technological knowledge which could be appropriated from what was publicly available with that supplied by companies from industrialised countries in technology transfer arrangements.
The concept of competitiveness at the national level is more problematic and controversial. The debate on this subject is complex because of the confusion that arises between the implications of static comparative cost advantage and the dynamic gains that exist if a country has a significant number of firms and industrial sectors which gain market shares internationally because of their competitiveness. The OECD defines the competitiveness of a country as: In both the OECD and the European Commission definitions, competitiveness represents the ability to make dynamic gains in the form of higher growth rates. These gains need not be at the expense of other countries as the growth in world output and trade should, in principle, enable all countries to increase their volume of exports and growth. However, in practice, there are relative gainers and losers as indicated by differences in the long term economic growth rates between countries. Typically, countries with high growth rates have also had high growth of exports showing that some have made relative gains at the expense of others.
In this sense, a measure indicating maintenance of competitiveness is the long term growth rate for a particular country or region in comparison with that of other countries and regions.
The definitions of competitiveness for a country or wider entity imply that the entity has a significant number of firms and industrial sectors which "meet the test of international markets" to maintain and expand "the real incomes of its people over the long term". However, a firm rarely develops competitiveness in isolation of the externa l linkages and environment in which it operates. This external context may include some or all of (a) competitive rivalry with national firms, (b) related and supporting firms, industrial sectors and industry associations, and (c) regulatory and enabling public agencies (see Nelson, 1992; Porter 1990 and Freeman, 1987) .
Latecomer industrialisation and the role of technology in development
It can also be said that the fast economic growth rates achieved by Japan between the 1950s and the 1980s, the East Asian NICs between the 1970s and 1990s and China's recent fast industrialisation are demonstrations of country competitiveness, though not necessarily based on advanced technology. The following discussion refers to the earlier stages of acquisition of technological capability by the so-called "first tier" Asian NICs or the four tigers, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
Conventional economics based explanations put the industrialisation and growth performance of the Asian NICs down to the outward oriented economic policies pursued by them. Important components of such a policy regime are (a) fiscal and monetary management which ensure low inflation rates and a stable and competitive currency, (b) a liberal trade regime, and (c) as few distortions as possible in the factor, goods and services markets. This explanation is also related to the "stages" theory of comparative advantage in which advantage shifts from the relatively low labour cost based industries to more skill and capital intensive manufacturing as an economy's factor endowments change in the course of development.
It is assumed that once the policy and price distortions are corrected, firms in developing countries are able to respond to world market demands using the comparative cost advantage offered by the country. There are two main arguments against this explanation . Amsden (1988 and and others have argued that in Korea a high level of government intervention and price distortions were used to support the major industries and Wade (1990) puts forward a similar thesis for Taiwan. Further, as competitive advantage is developed by enterprises in specific product markets, macroeconomic policies are not sufficient explanations of competitive advantage. In fact, no model can capture the diversity of the experiences and policies of these countries. The primary concern here is not with the economic policy issues but with the development of technological capabilities at the firm level in the Asian NICs and their lessons in understanding how national competitiveness can be developed through technology acquisition by industries and individual companies. These capabilities can be grouped into four broad categories:
i) Knowledge and skills required for the processing of production where shop floor experience and learning by doing play an important role; ii) Knowledge and skills required for investment, that is the establishment of new production facilities and the expansion and/or modernisation of existing ones; iii) Adaptive engineering and organisational adaptations required for the continuous and incremental upgrading of product design, performance features, and process technology; iv) The knowledge required for product and process innovation and the creation of new technology in some manufacturing industries.
It is only in the last stage identified above that innovation and development of technological capabilities take place. In the early period of rapid industrial growth, most industrial production in the Asian NICs was concentrated in consumer non-durable industries with relatively low technology requirements. Production capability was thus restricted to the efficient operation of labour intensive production processes. Firms in the Asian NICs have acquired the technological capabilities first and foremost by making judicious use of foreign technology sourcing. To gain the required knowledge quickly they relied on customer firms to provide specifications and concentrated on developing the capacity to produce to specifications at low cost. Korean and Taiwanese firms used original equipment manufacturer (OEM) agreements and Singapore and second tier NICs relied largely on FDI as means of entry into world markets. What is important is how effectively a firm combines foreign technology ele ments with its own experience and knowledge in order to strengthen its internal capabilities.
This focus provided firms with valuable experience in mass production methods and the more successful of them were able to learn from this experience and upgrade product quality, improve production processes and efficiency, move into higher value added segments and develop own brands. The "stages" for South Korea are set out in Table 1 . This model refers primarily to consumer products. As Amsden (1989) , among others, has shown, for heavier industries such as steel, chemicals and shipbuilding, there was much greater state support and protection.
A striking feature of the early development of the Asian NICs is that they largely sought to benefit from available technological knowledge from abroad. In this sense they were "free riding" on the scientific and technological knowledge base developed by the industrialised countries. However, in order to absorb the technological and scientific knowledge, education, and especially technical education, had to be of a high level. The policy focus was on improving education and training to develop the capacity to absorb and use the imported technology efficiently. Table 2 shows that advanced R&D started relatively late in Korea. The technological capability had to be combined with complementary management skills for commercial success. 
Technology imports
Production and R&D
1960s-1970s
Goal: establishment of production base.
Characteristics: heavy dependence on imported technologies.
Packaged technology: turnkey based plants.
Assembly technology.
Knock down production (SKD/CKD).
OEM-dominated.
Almost no in-house R&D.
Early 1980s
Goal: promotion of self-reliance. The Korean approach to technology development contrasts sharply with that adopted in India and China, both of which have long traditions of basic and applied science research, although a significant proportion of this is in military related fields (aeronautics, space and nuclear). Despite, or possibly because of, their scientific expertise and focus they have been slow to acquire proficiency in commercial applications of new technologies. This is partly because of sizeable barriers to diffusion of scientific knowledge, which raises questions about the effectiveness of the institutional structure or the national innovation system in the two countries. Another possible reason is that the scientific knowledge being developed was not of the kind that could be easily commercialised. Diffusion of scientific knowledge to raise the level of national competitiveness is by no means an automatic process and requires a number of relationships and appropriate incentive structures which are imperfectly formed in these economies. OECD, 1996) .
Characteristics

Box 2 -Trade or investment?
There are two recognised channels for transferring technology to enterprises, apart from the unofficial channels of espionage and copying (which is sometimes legitimised and termed 'reverse engineering').
The first of these is the trade channel ( Figure 2 ). This is where the foreign supplier provides technology in exchange for a financial return such as a one off payment, instalments, or a licence fee. The technology can be transferred though a local agent and there may be some local content added, depending on the conditions in the recipient country and the particular arrangement between the supplier and acquirer. is under the trade channel that there is the greatest risk o f leakage or misappropriation of the technology, so for this reason suppliers often withhold key hardware components or important pieces of know-how. The second transfer channel is the investment channel. This is where the transfer of technology forms part of the investment made by a foreign company in a host country. This can be through a wholly owned subsidiary, an equity joint venture or any other form of arrangement where there is a tangible or intangible contribution that gives the foreign supplier some management control within the host country. In anything other than a wholly owned subsidiary this control would be shared with a local partner who will also contribute a minor or major part of the total investment, which itself will have an influence on the amount of control exercised by each partner. With the investment channel there is more likely to be some local content, but it will probably be greater than with the trade channel with the amount increasing as the project develops.
Figure 2 The channels for transferring technology to enterprises
In practice there is a wide spectrum of types of arrangement for transferring technology . These are shown in Figure 3 . Direct exporting of technology products, one off technology transactions, licensing, co-production and subcontracting are all trade channel arrangements. Contract joint ventures, equity joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries are all investment channel arrangements, though there may also be some investment involved in co-production and sub-contracting. The extent of foreign investment, potential returns and financial risk increase as the form of arrangement moves increasingly away from pure trade and towards greater investment. Of course not all foreign investment is in the form of technology but in countries with fast economic growth a high percentage of technology based investment is a common feature. For example it is estimated that about 80% of the foreign direct investment into China has been in the form of technology.
Figure 3 Types of arrangement for transferring technology
I n c r e a s i n g f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , p o t e n t i a l r e t u r n a n d f i n a n c i a l r i s k As the global business environment becomes more competitive there is increasing pressure for companies i n the industrialised countries to make maximum use of the proprietary resources that form the basis of their technological competencies. Therefore, there often becomes a need to extend the application of their know-how through some form of technology collaboration. The international transfer of technology is being seen increasingly as a means whereby companies can globalise their production operations in order to take advantage of resource or market factors (De Toni et al, 1992) . To most manufacturing companies and many service businesses technology is a key resource that provides their distinctive capability and competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1993) . Often the transfer of technology will be to overseas subsidiaries, which may have been created as greenfield operations or could result from the takeover of a local company. However, in many cases, it will involve collaboration with foreign partners, possibly including some associated investment. Through joint use of technology, future added value can be generated that will provide a return to the technology 'owner' in exchange for its transfer, but only when the perceived benefits of transfer outweigh the costs and risks should owners share their technology through collaborative operations (Dunning, 1991) . It is therefore significant that, during the 1970s and 80s, such a form of collaboration, the international joint venture, replaced wholly owned subsidiaries as the preferred method for US multinationals of transferring technology internationally (She nkar and Zeira, 1987) .
For the receiving country, technology transfer also has potential internal benefits. For example many developing countries regard the inward transfer of technology as a means of rapidly catching up with the industrialised nations. China has been promoting technology transfer for this purpose in a range of advanced technology sectors. Transfer though collaborative partnerships involving foreign direct investment has been encouraged by the Chinese authorities as the preferred means of acquisition since its "open door" policy was introduced in the early 1980s (Lan, 1996) . At the same time the formation of technologybased collaborations provides foreign businesses with an important means of gaining entry to the Chinese market as well as providing the opportunity to take advantage of China as a production base. According to statistics provided by MOFTEC (the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Cooperation) actual foreign direct investment into China since 1979 reached a cumulative total of around £306 billion by the end of 1999 and the number of foreign funded projects reached about 285,000 in the same period.
China's foreign investment and technology transfer policies
The policy on technology transfer has undergone a number of changes since the People's Republic of China was established (Saich, 1989; Zhu et al, 1995) . At first, turnkey project investments supplied by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were the most important form of technology trans fer. These investments typically established whole industrial enterprises mainly in heavy industries such as steel, machinery and vehicle manufacture. After the deterioration of relations with the USSR, followed by the 'Cultural Revolution', China turned i nwards and tried to develop its own technological capability. During this period there was limited technology transfer from Western countries and Japan, mainly key facilities and equipment for scientific research. During the 1970s the bulk of technology imports were still in the form of complete sets of equipment or turnkey plants (Shi, 1998) . Investments during this time occurred mainly in the technologically backward sectors of petrochemicals, steel, electricity generation equipment and mining machinery industries, with the objective of developing technological capability in these sectors based on the more modern technology of the capitalist economies.
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution the decision was taken to begin some limited market reforms and to open up parts of the economy to more foreign trade and investment. A government review of technology transfer policy soon afterwards found previous approaches, which relied on turnkey projects and purchase of equipment, deficient in a number of respects (Bennett, Vaidya, Wang and Zhu, 1997) . The turnkey projects were expensive and provided limited scope for developing local technological capability. This conclusion is consistent with experience elsewhere, that developing capability beyond simply the ability to use technology requires time to learning and often necessitates long-term collaboration with the technology supplier (Lall, 1992) .
In 1986 the Chinese authorities announced the "Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment" to encourage the transfer of technology through foreign investment into what the government considered to be more 'productive' areas of the economy. Under these provisions, foreign joint ventures were granted a number of privileges including preferential taxation, simpler licensing procedures, freedom to import inputs of materials and equipment, more autonomy from bureaucratic interference, interest free loans, and the right to retain and swap foreign exchange with each other. Foreign investment enterprises that employed advanced technology and were export oriented also enjoyed additional tax benefits.
Box 3 -The phases of China's industrial development and related technology transfer policies
First Phase (1950s)
Industrial development based mainly on projects introduced from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
-Technology acquisition through turnkey projects into large scale industries.
Second Phase (1960's)
Largely independent industrial development.
-Small amounts of technology transferred from Western countries and Japan (mainly key facilities and equipment for scientific research).
Third Phase (1970s)
Industrial restructuring based on capital projects in technologically backward sectors.
-Technology acquisition mainly through turnkey plants in an attempt to develop technological capability in weak industries.
Fourth Phase (1980s)
Accelerating pace of industrial reform, particularly in the manufacturing sector.
-Emphasis placed on learning through technology transfer (mainly via Sino-foreign joint ventures -incentives for foreign investment through tax concessions etc).
Fifth Phase (1990s)
Rapid growth, less state ownership and intervention, extensive opening-up to foreign investment. Establishment of a 'socialist market economy'.
-More emphasis placed on the transfer of high technology. Concessions removed for low technology, labour intensive processing industries.
Sixth Phase (2000s)
Preparation for admission to WTO. Equalisation of tax regime for foreign owned and local companies.
-Transfer of high technology into wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries as well as joint ventures, including R&D and design capability.
These improved incentives and a growing awareness of the potential of the Chinese economy stimulated a dramatic increase in foreign investment into China in the early 1990s. For example in 1993 alone the contract value of new foreign investments was US$110 billion, which was more than the entire contact value of investments up to the end of the previous year. However, much of the foreign investment was in relatively low-technology, labour intensive, operations that took advantage of China's low wage costs and policies to attract investment into the Special Economic Zones (Thoburn and Howell, 1995) . Many such investments were in subcontracting operations, with higher level functions such as design and marketing often remaining in the home country (Lan, 1996) . Also, with many operations only involving assembly work of components supplied from outside (in 'screwdriver factories'), opportunities for local parts suppliers to upgrade their capabilities and grow their businesses were also limited.
As a consequence of this situation there has been some tightening of regulations and concessions affecting foreign investments. In 1994 the State Council announced a number of policies to promote foreign investment in specified key sectors including communications, energy and raw material sectors. There was also a tightening of procedures for the approval of contracts and the registration of foreign enterprises. These included stricter penalties if agreements were not fulfilled, new rules requiring foreign companies to invest capital within a prescribed period so as to reduce the gap between pledged and utilised investment, and new rules on the sharing of investment risks between Chinese and foreign investors to remove the need for investment guarantees.
In 1995 further guidelines were published detailing the foreign investments the government now wished to encourage, along with those that were to be restricted, prohibited or just permitted. These guidelines encouraged investment in high technology sectors (chemical fibres, micro-electronics, precision machinery, civilian aircraft, biotechnology and energy development) as well as infrastructure and agricultural developments. Investment in the priority sectors would continue to benefit from tax preferences and foreign invested companies in these sectors would be permitted to sell up to 100% of their output in the domestic market. Elsewhere, tax preferences were mainly to be phased out, although the authorities subsequently relaxed their stance when a number of high profile foreign companies made moves to reduce or withdraw their activities in China (Wu and Strange, 1997 ).
In 1998 the State Planning Commission identified eighteen industries, mostly in hightechnology sectors, where China wished to promote further foreign investment. These sectors would be granted a restoration of duty free status on capital equipment imports (Note: foreign funded companies could import capital equipment duty free but this concession was not available to local enterprises, therefore the government was trying to phase it out as a way of restoring a level playing field). These newly promoted sectors were high-technology industries, new technologies, transport and telecommunications equipment, electric power generation, aviation, oil and petrochemicals, machinery, electronics, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, textiles, metals and metallurgy, light industry, the service sector, and agriculture. At the same time the State Planning Commission also reaffirmed broad limits to foreign ownership in businesses in areas considered to be key sectors of the economy -such as nuclear power plants, satellites and aviation.
Also in 1998 the government announced that the tax systems for foreign and domestic companies were to be merged by the year 2000, a change that would more than double the tax burden on some foreign-invested enterprises. However, favourable treatment was retained for sectors and areas where China remains keen to attract foreign. This removal of some tax incentives for foreign investors signals a more discriminatory approach to foreign investment and is part of the Chinese government's attempt to redirect growth from basic industries (e.g.
shoes and toys) in favour of higher-technology sectors. In effect, the foreign investment regime is now more closely linked with domestic industrial policy priorities and wider economic and social objectives.
Factors influencing successful technology transfer to enterprises
Empirical evidence from actual cases has provided information about the factors that influence successful technology transfer. These can be summarised as follows:
• Having compatible objectives between the foreign supplier and local acquirer of the technology.
• Establishing an appropriate relationship or partnership form between the technology supplier and acquirer.
• Agreeing a value for the technology that is acceptable to both the supplier and acquirer.
• Ensuring the necessary technical and managerial skills are in place to absorb the technology.
• Confirming that the transferred technology will gain market acceptance and provide sufficient commercial returns.
• Ensuring security of the technology and protection of the foreign supplier's competitive advantage.
Four case studies of technology transfer to China are now described in order to demonstrate the factors influencing success together with the some of various aspects that need to be considered when transfer is taking place within different contexts. A discussion on each is provided so as to highlight the main points in relation to the factors and aspects that have been identified.
The case studies illustrate the following technology transfer situations:
1. Transfer of technology for the manufacture of mobile telecommunications equipment through an equity joint venture.
2. Transfer of techno logy for the manufacture of airframes for civil aircraft through a contracting agreement.
3. Transfer of technology for the manufacture of automotive engines through a one-off purchase of product designs and processing equipment.
4. Transfer of technology for the manufacture and development of machine tools through a collaborative co-production agreement.
The cases are all of real situations that have been investigated by the authors but fictitious names have been used to avoid any inadvertent breach of commercial confidentiality.
Box 4 -Case Study: Nordica HongYing Telecommunications
Nordica is a Scandinavian telecommunications equipment manufacturer. In China it manufactures telecommunications systems and equipment and mobile phones. It is one of the main suppliers of GSM 900 networks, GSM1800 networks and mobile telephones. It is also one of the key suppliers for fixed switching and transmission systems to operators, railways and oilfields.
One quarter of Nordica's business is in the Asia Pacific region and there was a 30% increase in sales to China in 1999 making China now the second most important market for the company after the USA. Worldwide there are 12 telecommunications infrastructure manufacturing facilities in 5 countries and 10 telephone handset manufacturing facilities in 8 countries. Nordica now has 7 joint ventures in China and one wholly owned subsidiary. It also has branch and representative offices throughout the country. Altogether around 3,500 people are employed in China. Mobile communications are highly regulated. Wholly-owned foreign enterprises are not allowed to provide services but they can make products provided they fulfil certain conditions. For example, although Nordica's wholly owned subsidiary makes the same product as other sites it is required to focus on exports.
Beijing Nordica HongYing Telecommunications Systems Ltd. (NHT) was established as part of Phase 2 of Nordica's entry strategy for China. Negotiations started in 1993 and the business licence was granted in 1994. There was already a good brand awareness of the company's products that had been established under Phase 1 but without local production its markets were limited to the railways, oilfields etc. It therefore needed to have a local joint venture partner and manufacturing facilities in China to be a credible supplier.
The Chinese partner is under the Aerospace Ministry, which it was thought had a strong influence and would provide good support from the Chinese government. HongYing already had experience of manufacturing telecommunications switching equipment from an earlier co-operation with a German telecommunications company to produce PABX exchanges. The joint venture contract is f or 25 years. NHT's building is rented from HongYing which uses some of the space for its own production. HongYing also has a separate building on the same site.
Initially NHT produced fixed telephone switching equipment and between 1994 and 1997 had begun to sell to the PTAs (Provincial Telecommunications Administrations) and PTBs (local bureaux) in provinces such as Henan and Hebei. It did not have a very big market share but had established a good position in the market. However, local Chinese companies were improving their capability to produce fixed switching equipment and were becoming a serious source of competition.
In 1997 Nordica therefore examined how it could move its strategy forward and in 1998 decided to change its business scope in China to manufacturing mobile GSM systems. At the time it had a reasonably good position in the Chinese mobile telecommunications market but it needed to be improved. Aother joint venture had already been manufacturing handsets since 1996 and NHT therefore changed to manufacturing mobile switching equipment. At the same time the ownership was changed so that Nordica now has 70% of the shares and HongYing holds 30%. The new ownership arrangement was reached amicably because HongYing thought 30% was still a good share of the new business activities. An R&D facility was also established on the same site in the same year but was a separate wholly owned subsidiary of Nordica's holding company in China. It would not be easy for Nordica to acquire 100% of the shares of the manufacturing company. Given its business scope and local markets it would be prevented by the regulations. In any case Nordica did not wish to have complete control because having a Chinese partner is still vital in the telecommunications sector for reasons of access, to understand the local regulations, handling the interface with the authorities etc. There are no difficulties working with the local partner; the roles of the two parties are clearly defined and there is good co-operation.
Between 1998 and the present time there have been big changes. A major technology transfer project was started in mid 1998 to bring in the latest technology and this has resulted in all mobile switching equipment for the Chinese market being supplied by NHT in association with its subcontractors in China and the local partner. In practice NHT does not actually manufacture any of the parts for its products (Nordica's core competencies are understanding market needs and designing new products fast). Manufacture of the major parts of products is completely outsourced to companies that have specialised manufacturing capability. NHT's activities are testing and integration so most of the production employees are software and systems engineers.
NHT is one of only two facilities worldwide for Nordica's mobile switching equipment, the other being in Europe. Therefore it is now moving from its original position of being simply a supplier to the Chinese market to becoming part of Nordica's global production network. NHT exports 20% of its output, but this will increase. Products are exported throughout the world, not just to the Asian region.
In the electronics sector NHT is ranked number 4 in Beijing in terms of sales and number 14 in China as a whole. Among mobile telecommunications equipment companies Nordica is now the leader in China for telephones, while another European based company is the leader for infrastructure. All Nordica's competitors for mobile telephones are selling in China, including some emerging Chinese companies such as HuaWae. Another Chinese company, EastCom, also produces mobile telephones but they are essentially re-badged products of an American partner.
NHT employs 170 people, more than 90% of whom are Chinese. Very few employees were transferred from the Chinese partner -only some key managers. Recruitment is normally through advertising, job fairs and via the Internet. There is also some rotation around the Nordica companies in China, although there is still sometimes some difficulty with the authorities in transferring the personnel files between cities so this is mainly relevant within Beijing. Apart from the normal selection criteria regarding technical skills etc., a knowledge of English is usually important. The company also tries to recruit people with the correct 'attitude' so people who had spent a long time in state owned enterprises would not normally be employed.
The company has a positive employee development policy. Each person has a job profile and a training plan is arranged accordingly. There is a production and software training centre and both theoretical and on-the-job training is used. A large number of employees went to Europe for between one and three months in 1998 as part of the major technology transfer project. Among the engineers about 30% went to Europe (approximately 50 people). There is also considerable attention paid to management and leadership training. There is a lot of theoretical training in China but Nordica's global facilities are also used for practical management training. Its facilities in the USA are often used for this purpose, especially when training relates to new technology development. In addition to the formal study organised by the company a lot of employees enrol for part-time study in local institutions.
The main target of the technology transfer project in 1998 for mobile switching equipment was to transfer manufacturing totally to China and in particular to local subcontractors. The emphasis was on systems integration. The person who ran the project was subsequently appointed Production Manager. He had considerable experience with transferring technology to other countries previously. The project involved transfer of manufacturing technology, establishing logistics procedures and systems to support production and supply together with training. The company made the conscious decision not to have "troops" of expatriates going to China but to recruit local people first. The emphasis was therefore on fast recruitment of local staff and training. The company tried to make good use of the existing Chinese staff in the Nordica organisation. There were many project teams comprising both European and Chinese staff. Some were led by Europeans and some by Chinese.
The first objective was to develop competence within the Chinese operation. This took between one and one-and-a-half years. The parent company in Europe was surprised at the speed of knowledge acquisition by the Chinese operation and has used the experience as an example of how to transfer knowledge to other countries.
The second phase of technology transfer was to further develop the company's subcontractors. There are 4 or 5 subcontractors with significant orders from Nordica in terms of volume. The company prefers to have a limited number and to get things right. One contractor is HongYing, the joint venture partner, some were in China already and others followed the company. Apart from the partner one other contractor is a wholly Chinese company. Developing logistics systems took a long time and by comparison the transfer of the necessary manufacturing technology was completed quite quickly. The idea that the competence in telecommunications is understanding market needs and designing new products, rather than manufacturing, is new to the Chinese authorities that have been more used to overseeing large vertically integrated enterprises. Nordica has been talking with MII (The Ministry of Information Industries) about this concept and it is enthusiastic about the idea. Under WTO Chinese telecommunications and electronics companies will be exposed to the full forces of the market and will need to operate in the same way so they have to become more focused. The MII needs to help Chinese companies to invest in resources and to recognise that it is not a labour intensive industry so labour cost is not important. Local companies such as HuaWei have this type of assistance. Nordica does not object to this and thinks it is understandable given China's circumstances.
NHT has done some benchmarking studies of its operations. It is now at about the same level as other Nordica plants worldwide across a range of metrics. The "bottom line" (i.e. cost of production) is about the same as the other mobile switching facility in Europe. Nordica's advantage is not simply in having low cost facilities in China but in having multiple production sites so it can balance supply and demand globally. Access to the China market is a secondary consideration now. The objective is to get "fair treatment" from the Chinese government and regulations. Having a manufacturing plant in China allows entry to the controlled market for telecommunications equipment. Then it is up to normal, competitive criteria such as having good products, competitive prices, good service and a local "presence". Establishing the Nordica brand is also important.
NHT has not experienced any big problems with technology transfer that has adversely affected the business. There have just been some technical issues that have required attention. The important thing has been to work closely with the Ministry of Information Industries to help influence the development of the industry in China. Most of the discussions are bi-lateral but there are also some multilateral "round table" meetings with several manufacturers, although these are mainly information sharing sessions rather than forums to discuss real issues.
Essentially the main problem for NHT is that the Chinese market is still regulated. For example there are quotas on imports that would not be allowed in Europe. However, this is changing. With the impending entry of China into WTO there will be an eventual removal of barriers. Most negotiations with the local authorities can be done by NHT itself now the company has become established but the Chinese partner still needs to be involved in high-level discussions with the government. However, this is something else that will change in the future.
The NHT case illustrates a number of aspects of technology transfer through Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, which have been the most popular form of transfer in the late 1980s and 1990s. One of the most important is the selection of a suitable partner by the foreign owner of the technology. As was mentioned above, compatibility of partners' objectives has been found to be a key factor for ensuring successful transfer. HongYing was not one of the established Chinese manufacturers of telecommunications equipment. It was under the Aerospace Ministry. However it did have the necessary technological capability and experience of telecommunications equipment through an earlier co-operation and appears to have complementary objectives to Nordica. It has often been found that when partners are in exactly the same industry they may not necessarily have the same objectives. For example foreign companies transferring technology to China usually do so with the aim of accessing the Chinese domestic market. On the other hand Chinese companies in the same industry often have the intention of using the acquired technology to penetrate export markets, which may be against the interests of the foreign partner. Another common example of incompatible objectives is where the foreign partner is taking a long-term view while and the Chinese partner is taking a short-term one. This is often the situation where the Chinese partner is a state owned enterprise that is burdened with debt and making losses. It therefore sees the technology transfer partnership as a means of helping its survival rather than as a means of improving its competitive position. Such an objective would conflict with the foreign partner's own strategic aims and probably lead to operational difficulties for the joint venture.
Another important aspect of equity joint ventures is the relative ownership shares of the two partners. Generally the foreign partner's preference is for a majority share. However, there are some successful joint ventures where the foreign partner only owns 50% (e.g. Shangha i Volkswagen) or even has a minority of shares (e.g. the UK company Pilkington owns only 17% of Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington Glass, although this has now converted from a joint venture to a publicly quoted company). The 70% share of NHT held by Nordica ensures it has adequate control over the joint venture while enabling the Chinese partner to have a satisfactory share of a commercially successful business. Since wholly foreign-owned companies are effectively not permitted in telecommunications equipment manufacture the partners seem to have achieved the optimum ownership arrangement.
A further aspect that is important in the Nordica HongYing case is security of the transferred technology. If the foreign supplier's know-how is appropriated by a third party then it might find its competitive advantage is threatened. Chinese telecommunications manufacturers have the ability to copy foreign products and adapt them to the local market. It is estimated that their technology lags only about one year behind that which western companies are producing. Copying can be done more effectively if there is an 'inside track' to the foreign technology, which is why some of the software codes (or source codes) are not provided to Chinese partners. Acquisition of the source code is a common issue in negotiations between western telecommunications companies and their Chinese joint venture partners. The Chinese side usually tries hard during negotiations to have the source code included in the transferred technology. They would then be 90% of the way towards being able to completely replicate the technology. Sometimes the source code has to be provided for effective localisation of the product. For example with pay phones it is necessary to use it when designing LCD displays with Chinese characters.
Box 5 -Case Study: DuCheng Aircraft Corporation
The DuCheng Aircraft Corporation, located in one of China's inland provinces, was originally established to manufacture jet fighters. It was founded in 1958 and the first aircraft was produced in 1964. Although its military output is intended primarily for the Chinese armed forces some of its production has been exported, mainly to the air forces of developing countries. The plant carries out design and development of aircraft as well as production and testing. There are 20,000 employees and 10,000 machines, 30 of which are modern numerically controlled machining centres. Military production still represents about 80 per cent of the output by value at DuCheng. However cuts in orders due to a scaling down of the Chinese armed forces in recent years have necessitated a move towards the manufacture of civilian products to make use of spare capacity. However, as an enterprise in the defence industry, it has not been left to diversify entirely at the mercy of the market. Diversification into non-defence activities was undertaken within a seven-year programme supported by the government. Along with other military aircraft producers, the enterprise was set the target to reduce revenue from its military production to 60 per cent of the total by the end of the seven-year programme period. However, the company's view was that this was too short a period for the required adjustment for such a large enterprise.
The major diversification for DuCheng has been related to its core business of aircraft production. The enterprise won a contract with Air Corp, a major US manufacturer of civilian and military aircraft, to produce nose sections for the airframe of its AC80 civilian airliner. DuCheng was supplied with drawings initially and, in addition, most of the materials and subassemblies were supplied by Air Corp themselves or by suppliers approved by Air Corp and the FAA (US Federal Aviation Agency). The tools and equipment were paid for by Air Corp. The training manuals were provided by Air Corp and training was carried out jointly by the two companies. Air Corp quality assurance personnel were stationed permanently at the factory.
Air Corp were looking for a low cost supplier in China and needed to make 'offset' agreements with Chinese companies as part of the contracts to sell its aircraft in China. It chose DuCheng as a subcontractor after considering a number of possible local companies. Other major world aircraft manufacturers also have similar subcontracting arrangements in China. Apart from the cost advantage offered by Chinese subcontractors, the Chinese civil aviation market is attractive for foreign aircraft manufacturers and subcontracting locally can be offered as a way to win orders. According to DuCheng, subcontracting from a Chinese company offers significant cost advantage to Western enterprises but the choice among Chinese subcontractors is not just based on cost but on competence and compatibility. Because DuCheng was not well located and transporting products overland to the coastal ports was difficult it needed to emphasise its technical competencies to compensate for this disadvantage. It had already carried out some work in cooperation with some European aircraft companies and had acquired a reputation for good quality work. Its inland location also meant that wages were lower than were paid by firms in the coastal areas of China. Although workers on civil aircraft production were paid 10% more than those making military aircraft the wage costs were still only a small fraction of those in the USA.
The contracting agreement was signed in 1989 and a number of DuCheng workshops were separated-out and transformed to standards set down by Air Corp. New lines were installed and production started after FAA approval with the first nose section being delivered in 1991. At the early stages of production Air Corp asked for quality improvements and increased production. The production capacity in 1994 was 24 per year but actual production was lower because of reduced demand. Therefore, although initially parallel production continued in the USA, DuCheng became the only producer of the nose sections for this particular model and all production was exported to Air Corp's plant in the USA where the final aircraft was assembled. A similar contract was subsequently undertaken to supply nose sections for another Air Corp aircraft, the AC90, with first delivery of these taking place in June 1996.
In the DuCheng case the technology transfer i s of the "international subcontracting" type within a new value system created and coordinated by the technology supplier. Here, there is no ownership of part of the local company by the foreign technology supplier. The foreign investment in the project is also limited. Although Air Corp provided all the tools and equipment for DuCheng these were technically still the property of Air Corp. In the longer term, the capabilities and relationships developed through such contracts could lead to closer cooperation with foreign enterprises to develop aircraft for the fast growing domestic market. For aircraft production, such a cooperation is likely to require a number of Chinese partners working with one or more foreign companies. However, at least two such potential cooperations for aircraft development and production have failed without any aircraft being produced. In one well-publicised case involving Chinese and European partners insufficient demand and limited public funds available in China were cited as the main reasons for the cancellation, while the reforms of China's aircraft manufacturing industry with planned cuts of 150,000 jobs were another consideration.
The case study has illustrated how DuCheng was able to use its existing capability for manufacturing military aircraft to absorb the technology supplied by Air Corp to produce civilian aircraft products. However, the business provided by Air Corp was insufficient to compensate for the shortfall in orders for fighters from the Chinese armed forces. Therefore, outside DuCheng's core business the company has diversified into a number of other product areas. These have included production of motorcycles, dry cleaning machines, hydraulic engineering products such as car jacks, water heaters, satellite dishes and wheelchairs. The company also won a contract from a Sino-German joint venture to produce the press moulds for car doors. Some of these other ventures are based on using DuCheng's in-house resources and skills to develop products and enter new markets (e.g. the car jacks were developed using its knowledge of hydraulics in aircraft and the order to manufacture press moulds was achieved because it was highly experienced in the use of CNC machine tools). Other ventures are examples of opportunistic diversification based on licences acquired from foreign companies (e.g. the manufacture of dry cleaning machines).
Box 6 -Case Study: NanBan Engine Works
NanBan Engine works, located in the suburbs of Beijing, is part of the New China Automotive Group (NCAG), which comprises a network of factories making engines and components for light trucks, tractors and cars. It is one of a number of automotive engine manufacturers given approval to develop engines by the Ministry of Machine Building Industry. Over the years product technology has been transferred into the group from the former Soviet Union, Germany and Japan. Traditionally in China the automotive industry has been horizontally integrated, with end product manufacturers (vehicle assemblers) being organisationally separate from the major producers of mechanical sub-units such as engines.
NanBan, which is the largest engine producer in the group, and the group as a whole, have been highly dependent on the sales of the MN283, an engine of old design produced in a number of plants within the group. The engine is used in locally produced light trucks and other indigenous vehicles such as 'jeeps' (the Chinese 'jeep', developed from the Russian 'Gaz' light military vehicle, has become a popular and cheap commercial road car). One aim in forming the group in 1988 was to bring together a number of plants producing the same or similar engines. The formation of the group has facilitated shared knowledge about the production of this engine within the group but no other rationalisation has taken place to date.
Although the MN283 engine is inexpensive, moderately reliable and produced in large numbers it is not fuel-efficient and its emission standards are poor. Therefore in the early 1990s NanBan acquired product and process technology from a major US motor manufacturer, including a complete assembly line with capacity to produce 250,000 units per year, for manufacturing a more efficient, cleaner, four cylinder light petrol engine. The assembly line was purchased at a cost of some US$ 18 million but at this price it was considered a bargain as it had been installed in the USA at around double the price in the early 1980s, but had been de-commissioned because of excess capacity and was virtually unused. The technical task of transferring the assembly line to China and re-installing it, a major undertaking involving some 40 of the company's engineers and technicians, was considered a success. Installation of the plant and bringing it up to the capability to make production test runs took less time than was predicted by the US company that sold the line.
However, despite the technical success in transferring the technology, commercial aspects proved more problematic and full production on the assembly line was not started. The new engine was intended to replace the MN283 as the largest selling of the company's engines. However, the NanBan found that the cost of production with the assembly line working at full capacity would be 50 per cent higher than that for the MN283. Consequently, although the new engine is of better quality and offers greater fuel efficiency and reliability, the present customers of the MN283 (mainly assemblers of light trucks, 'jeeps' and other vehicles of local manufacture), who themselves face severe competition in the markets for their vehicles, have found this higher cost unacceptable.
NanBan therefore decided to wait until its existing customers were ready to accept the new engine and, meanwhile, tried to seek new customers. One idea was to try to sell the engines to a recently established joint venture between another Chinese company and the US motor manufacturer that had supplied the assembly line. This joint venture, located in Northeast China, had been set up to make light trucks and cars designed by the US partner. However, subsequent investigations revealed that several technical and commercial difficulties stood in the way of this opportunity. Most newer vehicles made in China involving foreign joint venture partners either produce their own engines or have established relationships with engine suppliers, thereby making market access for indigenous manufacturers very difficult. A further difficulty was that the engine made by NanBan was no longer used by the US company in its own vehicles.
NanBan was a technologically capable company and had demonstrated that it was able to transfer and implement both the product and process the technology for the new engine. However, the company found itself in a vicious spiral. During the time it was waiting for new markets to emerge or for its existing customers to accept the new engine the production line was becoming outdated, while spares and service for the sophisticated electronic control systems were becoming increasingly difficult to acquire. NanBan also did not properly assess the value of the technology. The price it paid seemed reasonable because it was much lower than the original cost of the technology (the production line). However, value and price are not the same thing. Value is a concept that is affected by many factors. Among these are the cost to the 'owner', the potential for the technology in commercial terms, any substitutes that are available, and the overall affect on the perceived worth of the company. It is also dependent on the point along the 'value chain' that it is transferred. NanBan's judgement of value was clearly wrong within the circumstances it faced at the time.
A major blow to the company came in the late 1990s when the Chinese government introduced environmental legislation banning high polluting vehicles from major cities, principally Beijing, thereby slashing demand for its core product, the MN283 engine. By this time the end-customers for cars, who are increasingly becoming private individuals rather then organisations, were being attracted towards imported vehicles and foreign models made by joint ventures rather than locally designed and manufactured models. Upgrading local vehicles with the new engine was therefore no longer an option. NanBan's ent ire market was therefore rapidly disappearing and the company's future was put into jeopardy. This is an example of a technically competent technology transfer that faced commercial difficulties because the product intended to be made with the technology w as not appropriate for customers in the existing value system and development of new value systems was not possible in the short-term. Developments of this type either require a clearly identified market for the product or for the manufacturer to be within a vertically integrated production system. Importing this technology into a horizontally integrated group in the prevailing market conditions and industry structure proved to be fraught with difficulties.
Box 7 -Case Study: Midland Tools and ChangZhong: A Technology Collaboration For New Product Manufacture And Development
Midland Tools, a UK company, and ChangZhong Machinery, a company in Northwest China, are both in the medium size category of machine tool manufacturers. Midland Tools' major products include CNC single and multi spindle automatic turning lathes and turning centres produced to international quality standards. Changzhong is also a specialised turning machine manufacturer. Approximately half its output is of conventional machines and half is CNC machines. The quality of its machines has been given a high ranking in terms of customers' satisfaction in the domestic market and in 1997 it shared with one other Chinese company a national best quality award for its CNC turning lathes from the Ministry of the Machinery Building Industry. ChangZhong has captured 24% of the Chinese market for CNC turning machines.
The objective for ChangZhong in collaborating with Midlands Tools was to acquire the advanced technology the company haddeveloped. Through the transfer process ChangZhong could learn specialist subassembly skills, process programming knowhow, design know-how and final assembly skills. In terms of technological capability improvement ChangZhong's eventual aim from the collaboration was to enable it to produce complete CNC turning centres of the type to be introduced to local market. Midland Tools' objective on the other hand was to improve product competitiveness by combining technological and cost advantage. Through the collaboration Midland Tools would be able technically to achieve greater competitive advantage and, together with ChangZhong, could developed the product at lower cost. From a longterm strategic point of view the competitive strength of their co-developed product, coupling with high technology with low cost, would be very important in enhancing their position in both local and world markets (see Table 3 ).
The technology collaboration agreement between the two companies was signed in 1997. The technology product was a CNC turning lathe of entirely new design. The form of collaboration comprised subcontracting, new product co-development and co-production. In the initial stage of the project the terms of payment agreed was that Midland Tools provided technology free of charge in the form of drawings and in return purchased machine carcasses supplied by CJC at reduced cost. The transfer arrangement was based on four phases. i) In phase one the basic machine was to be manufactured and sold by Midland Tools with machine carcasses made and supplied to Midland Tools by ChangZhong. ii) In phase two complete machines were to be made by ChangZhong. iii) In phase three Midland Tools and ChangZhong would co-design and co-develop new versions of the machine. iv) In phase four, carcasses of the newly developed machines would be made in China by ChangZhong for supply to Midland Tools and complete machines made by ChangZhong for sale in the local market. Midland Tools' main activities would include provision of drawings, key parts, training and technical supervision to ChangZhong as well as final assembly on the basis of carcasses supplied from ChangZhong and sale of products in the world market. ChangZhong's responsibilities would be for machining parts and assembling carcasses and for complete manufacture in the later phases. In relation to new product development both parties would jointly be involved in design and development. The focus of this would be to produce designs that would benefit from the opportunities offered for cost reduction from:
i) Local "in-house" manufacture of parts by ChangZhong. ii) Purchase of proprietary and commercial parts by ChangZhong from local suppliers iii) Local assembly by ChangZhong iv) Joint selling of the newly developed products in local and world markets
The collaboration arrangement between Midland Tools and ChangZhong was designed to ensure there was immediate financial benefit to both parties. In many technology transfer based collaboration arrangements, the acquiring partners have suffered financially because they have lacked the marketing skills to sell more expensive co-produced machines in local markets. This in fact has become one of the main causes of failure of many collaborative ventures. Midland Tools recognised that converting technological success into commercial results can be problematic, so from the start the company gave first priority to the issue of market sales. In phase one Midland Tools was fully responsible for the sale of products in all markets, so taking advantage of its established name and reputation throughout the world. Additionally, by sourcing materials (parts and machine carcasses) at lower cost, greater commercial benefits could be derived through either increased sales by offering lower prices or by maintaining prices and selling at higher margins. Meanwhile, ChangZhong could also achieve its commercial objectives by supplying carcasses to Midland Tools rather than trying to sell finished machines. Equally important, the subcontracting arrangement did not incur significant extra cost to ChangZhong because it already had sufficient expertise to manufacture the sub-contract parts and the general assembly skills to make the carcasses. Midland Tools and ChangZhong would be able to share the product development costs and future profits from sales when the newly developed products were introduced into the market, thereby ensuring a financially equitable arrangement in phases three and four. Midland Tools would also receive a royalty on future sales in China.
The main benefits of the collaboration for Midland Tools are in terms of cost reduction.
There are three aspects of the collaboration from which this is derived:
i) The purchase of carcasses from ChangZhong which would otherwise be manufactured by Midlands Tools at higher cost.
ii) The purchasing of other parts from ChangZhong which otherwise would be supplied by subcontractors at highe r cost.
iii) The effective use of each partner's expertise for co-design and co-development.
ChangZhong on the other hand obtained advanced knowledge and skills in the following ways:
i) By learning process programming know-how and acquiring assembly know-how and skills from the process planning and build specifications. ii) By acquiring product design and development know-how from drawings provided by Midland Tools and co-design and co-development exercises. iii) By gathering quality control and production management knowledge through training and phased project planning.
The collaboration brought invaluable strategic benefits to both partners. Midlands Tools had the opportunity of exploiting the commercial potential of its technology by reducing cost, increasing sales in existing markets and developing new markets. It also benefited from the complementary knowledge of ChangZhong when co-designing and co-developing the new products. ChangZhong gained access to leading edge technology for a specific product, thereby enabling it to optimise its future product development. Since the machine being chosen for the collaboration was relatively smaller in size and lower in value compared with the other products in Midland Tool's product portfolio, the strategic benefit for both partners was the opportunity to develop a highly competitive new machine range in terms of performance price ratio, and consequently to a create a new niche in both the world and Chinese markets.
The collaboration was fundamentally based on the enhancement of joint competitive strength by exploiting each party's advantage. Midlands Tools (the technology supplier) and ChangZhong (the acquirer) obtained, respectively, the benefits of technological and cost advantages. Moreover, each other's respective advantage was the other's disadvantage. By jointly using their complementary advantages they could achieve a competitive position that would otherwise be out of reach of each partner on its own (see Figure 4 ). In line with this strategy the operational approach to the collaboration placed emphasis on how best to employ each party's strength along with its capability for improvement so as to achieve sustainable enhancement of joint competitiveness.
Successful transfer of technology through this type of collaboration depends on a commitment on the part of both parties that will lead to the realisation of mutually compatible objectives. Overall, Midland Tools' and ChangZhong's objectives were well matched but the question arises of how to guide the operation towards realising the mutual transfer objectives. As mentioned earlier, combining together high technology and low cost advantage is the core for such technology collaborations. However, in many such cases problems have been encountered in that acquirers may not have access to adequate knowledge if transfer is driven by cost reduction objectives alone. This in turn often leads to failure in achieving an adequate return with consequently neither of the two parties' objectives being realised. To ensure the realisation of both parties' objectives the collaboration arrangement between Midland Tools and ChangZhong was designed as a comprehensive package. One of the key features of the arrangement was to effectively link cost reduction practice with the technology transfer and learning process. In other words, costs were progressively reduced while technology was gradually transferred. Cost reduction targets and transfer targets ran in parallel throughout each phase so that further cost reductions could be achieved along with the acquirer's technological capability improvement derived from the transferred technology. The co-design and co-development of the new product was the thread linking together cost reduction practice and the transfer process and, based on this aspect, it was decided a new product featuring high technology and low cost. 
Lessons for the Arab world
This paper now looks at the situation in the Arab world and seeks to find some lessons based on the foregoing discussion about technology transfer to East Asian countries. As an initial comment, however, it should be said that no attempt has been made here to consider the special circumstances relating to the Muslim faith that are often considered relevant to Arab and other countries where Islam is the main religion among the population (Zuriek, 1978; Niazi, 1996; Hegasy, 1999) . In finding lessons for the Arab world regarding the question of technology transfer and development it is first appropriate to make some comparisons between the respective economies of the Arab and Asian regions. Table 4 therefore compares the principal countries in the Arab region with those in the region of East and Southeast Asia.
In terms of total GDP it can be seen from the Of course it is important to recognise that the high GDP figures of many Arab countries, especially those of the Gulf states, are inflated by revenues from the extractive industries, principally oil and gas production. Table 5 puts this into perspective. In the case of nine of the Arab countries in this table the added value for their extractive industries is in excess of US$ 3 billion and seven have GDP per capita figures for their extractive industries in excess of US$ 1,000. For comparative purposes this table also shows the value added and GDP per capita for the manufacturing industries of the Arab countries. Here, for eight countries the value added for manufacturing is more than US$3 billion and for five the GDP per capita for manufacturing is more than US$ 1,000 (For detailed information on GDP and the output of extractive and mining industries in the Arab countries see Appendices 1 to 5). However, these data should be interpreted with care because in many of the oil and gas producing countries their manufacturing activities are related to 'downstream' processes such as petroleum refining and chemical production. Therefore the final column in the table shows the ratio between the GDP per capita for each countries' manufacturing and extractive industries ('B' ) 'A'). Where there is a higher value for this ratio the manufacturing activities are likely to be less related to the oil and gas sector. For example Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco all have well developed textile, clothing and footwear industries while Lebanon produces furniture and metal goods. Iraq and Sudan are special cases in this analysis. Due to the international embargo on exports Iraq's oil production was only $US 26 million in 1998 compared with US$ 1,665 million in 1990, while Sudan's long-running civil war has had the effect of distorting its economic activities. In terms of their incentive to attract foreign investment and transfer technology, as well as their ability to absorb and use the technology, the countries of the Arab region need to be separated into two groups, i.e. those with comparatively large energy resources and those without. Of course an additional factor for countries with energy resources is the extent to which these support the overall economy and the relative period of time their reserves are expected to last. Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of oil in the world (26% of the proved total) and, relative to its size, Kuwait is similarly well endowed (10% of the world total). The UAE also has reserves of oil and gas that should last for over 100 years (CIA, 2000) . All these three countries have a large GDP per capita and buoyant economies. However, not all the major oil and gas producing countries are as strong economically. For example both Algeria and Libya have high levels of unemployment (both around 30%) and low living standards (which in Libya's case is due to an uneven distribution of the country's wealth). Both these countries have therefore tried to diversify by attracting foreign investment outside the energy sector, but to date with limited success.
The most interesting case in the Arab region as far as technology acquisition is concerned is Egypt. Here, production of oil and gas is large in absolute terms but relative to the total population it is fairly small. It also has a moderately high unemployment rate (estimated at 12% in 1999). Through a reduction in the state-owned sector and the implementation of new business legislation it has increasingly attracted foreign investment, mainly in low technology industries such as textiles and clothing, but also in some higher technology areas such as automotive manufacture. It has also sought to upgrade its physical and communications infrastructure in order to improve its attractiveness to investors. As a consequence a number of industrial sectors have been developed (Abdallah et al, 1999 ):
• The textile industry, representing 31% of total industrial output at US$ 2.3 billion • The chemical industry, representing 26% of total industrial output at US$ 1.6 billion • The food industry, representing 18% of total industrial output at US$ 1.2 billion • The metal industries, representing 8% of total industrial output at US$ 750 million Egypt has also tried to foster the growth of small, technology based, companies though a nationwide incubator programme under the umbrella of the Social Fund for Development (Darwish, 1999) . It is important to note that during the last decade Egypt has experienced one of the highest GDP growth rates in the Arab world, bringing it closer to energy-rich Saudi Arabia in terms of total GDP (See Figure 5 ). This been achieved through a combination of growth in both the extractive and manufacturing sectors (See Appendices 2 and 4). Foreign direct investment (as opposed to portfolio investment) is often assumed to be a proxy for technology transfer. Although not all foreign investment is in the form of technology (as was mentioned in Box 2), in countries with fast economic growth a high percentage of technology based investment is a common feature. In the case of China, for example, it is estimated that about 80% of the foreign direct investment has been in the form of technology, much of which has been transferred into high value-adding manufacturing industries and this is generally regarded as being one of the main contributors to its success in becoming a major international competitor in a number of key sectors. Some of the industries into which this technology has been transferred include machinery, telecommunications equipment, steel making, consumer electronics, pharmaceuticals etc., as illustrated in the earlier case studies and elsewhere (Bennett et al, 1996; He et al, 1998) .
However, when examining the situation in the Arab world the picture becomes less clear. Many of the Arab countries have foreign investments in the oil and gas industries that do not involve the type of technology that will raise the general level of productive capability and hence improve national competitiveness. Figure 6 shows the inward forward direct investment flows into a number of selected countries over the last 15 years, including some in the Arab region. The very large amount of investment into China is evident, although this has reduced more recently. Brazil has also seen large amounts of investment, which have mainly resulted from the policy of privatising its state owned industries during the early 1990s. This has led to foreign companies investing in a number of large Brazilian domestic industries, especially in the telecommunications and utilities sectors, although not always with accompanying technology transfer. Hong Kong's situation is interesting in that it has always been a conduit for foreign investment into mainland China, so it is significant that the amount of investment has continued to rise since the handover in 1997. South Korea and Taiwan have also seen continued increases, except for a temporary downturn in Taiwan in 1998. This has led to both these countries developing world class productive capability in a number of high technology manufacturing industries, especially electronics production where they are now second only to Japan in the East Asian region (see Figure 7) .
Two of the Arab countries selected for this analysis, Egypt and Morocco, have received modest amounts of foreign direct investment compared with many of the countries in the East Asian region. Nevertheless, at around US$ 1 billion per annum it is significant compared to most of the Arab world. Among the Arab countries the greatest amount of foreign investment has been going into Saudi Arabia. Despite its huge oil reserves Saudi Arabia has a burgeoning population and has carried a budget deficit since 1983. The government has therefore increased the amount of private ownership of its economic activity and about 35% of GDP now comes from the private sector. In turn this has increased the amount of foreign investment into its petroleum and utilities sectors, although there has also been an attempt to increase the amount of non-oil exports. To this end the Saudi government is promoting a number of joint venture opportunities to foreign investors in such industries as food processing, automotive component manufacture; building materials and ceramics, chemicals, electrical equipment, engineering, furniture, paper products, plastics, rubber and textiles (US -Saudi Arabian Business Council, 2001).
Figure 7
Output, capability and experience comparison of East Asian electronics industries (WTEC, 1997) It must be noted that one peculiar characteristic of the foreign investment data for Saudi Arabia, along with some other Arab countries such as Yemen and Libya, is that there have been periods where inward foreign investment has been negative, possibly due to divestment of assets by foreign companies exceeding the investments made during that period. Am ong the major East Asian counties only Indonesia has exhibited this characteristic, during 1998 and 1999. The relative change in foreign investment, and the erratic nature of investment into Saudi Arabia, are clearly illustrated in Figure 8 . 
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The opportunities for national technology development
There appears to be common agreement that the countries of the Arab world need to improve the output of their non-energy related industries (Maeena, 1997) . However, the Arab countries number around twenty with a total population of approximately 280 million. Although there is a view that economic integration is a prerequisite for achieving the desired level of industrial competitiveness the history of the region shows that numerous attempts at unification and cooperation have come to very little (Zineldin, 1998) . Therefore it is unlikely that technological development could be achieved within a single economic policy as has occurred in China over the last twenty years.
The way in which technological development and improved national competitiveness of the non energy-rich countries could be achieved is through the "stages" approach of the Asia n NICs in which advantage shifts from the relatively low labour cost based industries such as textiles and simple metal goods to more skill and capital intensive manufacturing as their economies' factor endowments change in the course of development. Like the Asian NICs the Arab countries tend to compete with each other rather than cooperate. Therefore the strongest companies that survive the intensity of competition would emerge as the major industrial enterprises. These will be the companies that can acquire and harness technology most efficiently to create their competitive advantage. The concept of technology acquisition is not new to the Arab countries. Zahlan (1978) refers to the fact that more than six hundred large and small petroleum and petrochemical projects were executed in the Arab world in a period of almost twenty years since 1959. However, it is most probable that these would mainly be turnkey projects with very little know-how being transferred to the host country. Therefore the techno logical dependence on the foreign technology supplier remains. The opinion of some, therefore, is that this technological dependence can be reduced by creating domestic research and development (R&D) capability (UNCTAD, 1978) although, as was mentioned earlier, R&D is only one part of the overall process of technological development and improved competitiveness.
Given the above arguments, the way forward for the non energy-rich Arab countries would seem to be based on the approach being taken by Egypt as being closest to fitting the "stages" theory of the Asian NICs. This takes the form of a dual strategy comprising liberalisation of the legislative and trade regime coupled with the acquisition and adsorption of technology through foreign investment (Yo ussef, 1999) . The main incentive for foreign companies to transfer technology to Egypt is through a local content requirement that obliges them to develop the capability of indigenous suppliers so their own vendor quality standards can be met. This has worked with some success in the automotive sector. However, it is generally agreed that the automotive industry in Egypt is populated by too many manufacturers for the size of the market. Hence it is likely that this, and other industries, will eventually follow the pattern of development that has been common in Asia where rationalisation subsequently takes place involving closures and mergers between competing firms, leaving the most efficient to form the bedrock of the technology based economy.
Based on the experiences of the East Asian economies there are a number of t mechanisms that could be explored as a means of encouraging and supporting technology transfer and development. There could include the following:
• Liberalisation of foreign investment r egimes and provision of opportunities for technology based foreign companies to participate in local economic activity (e.g. Jomo et al, 1999) .
• Identification and targeting of specific industrial sectors for special policies aimed at promoting their growth and competitiveness (e.g. Belderbos, 1997; Lee, 1997) .
• Provision of support for innovation in small to medium sized enterprises (e.g. Huang and Ward, 2001 ).
• Establishment of high-tech incubators and industrial zones, i.e. creation of "technopoles" (e.g. Bennett et al, 1999) .
Apart from such specific measures, which to be most effective would ideally require cooperation among the Arab countries as well as measures taken by individual governments, there is also a need for the Arab world to engage with the developed world on issues relating technological development. This needs to be done within the context of any policy statements or papers that have been prepared by government bodies and agencies in, e.g. the USA and European Union (see for example Office of Technology Assessment, 1984; EU, 2001 ).
